Privatization of electricity service delivery in developing nations: issues and challenges by Jaffar, Abdul Razak et al.
 202 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Developing countries adopt privatization due to different needs. While 
for some countries it was due to financial crises, budget deficits, poor 
investment in infrastructure and inability of the government to manage 
the state owned enterprises; for others it was based on need to expand 
and extend quality services to their growing populace through 
divestiture, public private partnership, outsourcing and granting of 
franchise to the private investors (Ghosh, 2001).  
 
Nightingale & Pindus (1997) suggest that, there is no particular meaning 
of privatization because it has a wide range of coverage in models and 
methods. Definitively, privatization is the contract with the private 
sector engaging them in the production and provision of the good and 
services that were hitherto exclusively provided by the government. It 
can involve among others, these four dimensions as; trading-off of State 
owned enterprises to private body; saddling a private business man with 
the responsibility of providing a certain service; making the users of 
service publicly provided to pay for cost recovery; or provision of 
subsidized ticket for affordability of the low-income earners to cope 
with the privately provided good and services (Sepehr, 2013; England, 
2011; Oyebanji, 2010; Robert Poole, 2008). 
 
In the early 1980’s Britain under Margret Thatcher’s regime started the 
rise of state owned privatization. It was an attempt towards free market 
economy originated from the neo-classical and neo-liberal economists 
‘wealth of nations’ by Adam Smith (1937) and Milton Friedman (1955). 
Resulting from this, both the advanced countries for example the USA, 
Canada, France, Italy, Spain, Western Europe and developing Asian 
and Sub-Sahara countries had followed suit, adopting the privatization 
approach for some of their public service delivery (Hussain, 2014; 
Sepehr, 2013; Flynn & Asquer, 2013; McKenzie & Mookherjee, 2013; 
Salimi et al, 2012; Gilroy, 2010; Kosar 2006; Rondinelli & Iacono, 
1996).  
 
Basically the forces that gave rise to privatization of public enterprise 
are drawn from two factors – the push and pull factors. The push 
factor can be said to be associated with the macroeconomic events 
occasioned by financial and fiscal crisis and inability to invest on 
infrastructure facility in most of the developing countries leading to 
deregulation policy. On the other hand, the pull factor can be said to 
be associated to situations and conditions such as - attempt to source 
revenue from sale of state assets to private investors, the lending 
conditions of the International Financial Institution, the aftermath 
experiences of the pioneers of privatization, as summarized in Table 1.  
 
Generally, the advantages of privatization at micro level are among 
others; increase firm efficiency and productivity and acquire skill and 
expertise to curtail political interference. Whilst at the macro level it 
generates direct cash from the sale of unprofitable national assets, and 
the capitalization of local stock markets as new companies list (Flynn 
and Asquer, 2013; McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2013:2; Government 
of Guyana, 1994 in Sepehr; 2013; Rufin, 2000). However, while 
privatization thrive well in the western industrialized countries, it 
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acclaimed a widespread failure in many developing nations (Pavanelli, 
2015). 
 
This paper presents a critical review of privatization practices of 
alternative Service Delivery approach of selected Asian and African 
nations. The paper would also elicit the common variants of 
privatization models adopted by these nations and the different 
implementation strategies which resulted in divergence in effectiveness 
and efficiency in the service delivery of electricity. 
 
 
2. Privatization of Power Sector Issues in Selected 
Asia and Africa Countries 
 
The reasons for privatization approach in the power sector among the 
developing countries are based on certain differing issues. Some 
countries like India, China, Cameroon and Nigeria shared similar issues, 
while Malaysia and South Africa have issues that differ from the former. 
Privatization is an approach to liberalize and reform the state of the 
economy. Many countries like India, China, Cameroon and Nigeria have 
adopted privatization due to financial crisis, investment constraint, 
conditions imposed by the International Financial Organizations.  
 
India, for example, has adopted the privatization approach since 1991 to 
address above mentioned issues. Despite the poor performance of public 
sector undertakings (PSUs), Kapur and Ramamurti (2002), have 
described the privatization process in India as slow. The connections 
between the managers and the politicians were seen as the inhibiting 
factors successful privatization (Makhija, 2006). Megginson and Netter 
(2001) in support of privatization highlight the many benefits of 
privatization, as against the loss-making PSUs, external debt crisis, and 
the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Compared to India, privatization in China was launched earlier in 1984. 
Prior to this, leasing and contracting system approach were use to 
improve the effectiveness of the SOEs (SOE stand for State Owned 
Enterprises).  This was encouraged towards end of 1980, and a 
regulatory body was established in 1988 (Yao, 2004). The term Gaizhi 
meaning “changing system” a reflection of privatization begins to unfold. 
Among the activities privatized are - the primary sector, light industry 
and heavy manufacturing industry (Aizhu, 2015). Véronique Salze-
Lozac’h, (2015) observed the possibility of China being the biggest 
power purchasing parity (PPP) by 2014. 
 
Compared to India and China, the Nigeria power sector is in a worse 
situation. Poor performance; weak operating system; engagement of 
quack; inexperience and unqualified managing team; ill-conceived 
government policies; unfriendly investment atmosphere and inadequate 
funding of the government enterprises; form the bases for privatization 
in Nigeria (Oyetunji, 2013;Olatinwo, et al, 2013; Asika, 1999 in 
Udoka & Anyingang, 2012; Ajao et al. 2009). 
 
The need for power reform in Cameroon was similar to the above, as it 
was occasioned by misappropriation and insufficient fund to run the 
power sector (Kamdem, 2008; Pineau, 2004). Policy options were 
discussed to increase public investment spending and efficiency, while 
preserving fiscal sustainability (IMF, 2014). Privatization of electricity 
was premised on inadequate supply of power in the face of 
development and economic expansion and the shortage of fund on the 
part of the government to offset the incurred debt and for expansion of 
the power sector. Societe Nationale d’Electricity (SONEL), the state 
power company responsible for the generation and distribution of 
power for the country, is always being affected by the seasonal 
fluctuation of water for hydro-generation (IFC Report, 2012).  The 
International Financial Corporation (World Bank Group) was 
appointed by the government of Cameroon as lead advisor in the 
privatization process. The IFC play a dual role of preparation and 
execution of the transaction, whilst at the same time advising the 
government on the establishment of new electricity legal framework 
and setting up of regulatory agency. Through the transaction structured 
by the World Bank it is recorded that the post-tender results had a 
positive shift in the electricity generation record (IFC Report, 2012), 
but political interference, weak regulatory body, corruption (Atangana, 
2012), distributive defect, unstable tariffs and impact on the people had 
been the contentious issues in the country (Pineau 2004). Attempt to 
improve energy in Cameroon led to the taken over of all assets of 
American Electricity Services by a British Company Eneo, as such, the 
Push factor Pull factor 
Macroeconomic events: 1970 oil crisis, Post-Soviet economy-
wide market-based transition (1989), Asian Financial crisis 
(1997-1998), economy-wide liberalization and reform 
programs as initiated by the fiscal crisis 
Capital raising options: privatization of state assets, green-
field private investment. 
Limited national fiscal ability: high public debt, utility bor-
rowing as a major proportion of national debt. 
Lending for institutional reform: macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion lending conditional upon power sector restructuring, 
asset privatization (IMF), liberalization and reform for new 
power sector loans (World Bank in 1993). 
OECD Deregulation: new energy multinationals created as 
a result of OECD energy sector deregulation, provided 
investment opportunities for Europe and USA 
Spill-over effects from international experiences: learning 
from pioneering reforms of power sectors in Chile, Eng-
land and Wales and Norway in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Investments constraints of the power sector: no ability to 
self-finance, system upgrading and modernization required 
high projected electricity demand 
EU accession: opportunities to benefit from regional inte-
gration by reforming the power sector in accordance with 
the EU Directives 
Table 1 The push and pull factors of power reforms 
Source: Adapted from Nepal and Jamasb (2012a in Nepal & Jamasb, 2013) 
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Cameroonian electricity company, AES Sonel, was officially renamed as 
Eneo Cameroun SA (Energy of Cameroon) on September 12, 2014, 
following the British private equity investment firm, Actis.
(businesscameroon.com, 2014). 
 
On the other hand, the reasons for power reforms in Malaysia differ 
from the forgoing issues. Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) is the only 
body responsible for the control, generation, transmission, distribution 
and sale of electricity in the country. The Independent Power producers 
(IPPs) were only given the competitive bidding in the generation sector 
in 1993. The state of Sabah Electricity Private Limited came under TNB 
in 1998 (Zamin, ET. Al. 2013). The Malaysian Electricity Supply 
Industry (MESI) as sole regulatory body since the government has a 
larger share of 73% in the power reform (TNB website, 2013). The 
TNB was the transition name from National Electricity Board of the 
States of Malaya due to privatization in 1990 under the Electricity 
Supply Act. Privatization was due to increase in demand for electricity 
and shortage of fund unlike some other countries in the developing 
world being occasioned by inefficiency of their power suppliers. 
 
In South Africa, although electricity operability follows the normal 
vertical integrated form of other countries like Brazil, Nigeria, and 
India, the provision of electricity is the prerogative of state (Hertzmark, 
2012). The reason for power reform is somehow similar to Malaysia, 
The problem of electricity actually emanated from the provision of 
electricity at low price to both the industrial and household consumers, 
leading to the expansion of some of these heavy consumers of power. 
This coupled with the need to extend electricity to the people cut off by 
apartheid and the lack of corresponding investment in the sector cause 
extreme burden to the existing infrastructure. As demand increases and 
supply lagging behind, it culminated into a situation of power shortage 
(Hertzmark, 2012). 
 
2. Models of power reform in the selected countries 
 
There are various models of privatization such as -Natural Monopoly, 
where nobody has the choice of supplier as there is no competition in 
the generation, transmission and distribution, all are vertically 
integrated. The Single Buyer, who chooses from various generators 
(IPPs) and channeled through transmission, distribution and final sale to 
the customers. The Wholesale Competition where the distribution 
companies choose to buy directly from generator (IPPs) and channeled 
to the final customers, and they have access to transmission lines. Finally 
the Retail Competition where all the customers have choice of supplier 
with direct access to transmission and distribution lines (Eberhard, 
2004). The most common model adopted by Malaysia, Cameroon and 
South Africa is the vertical integrated Natural Monopoly model while 
India, China and Nigeria adopted the wholesale competition model. 
 
The wholesale model was adopted by India in 1999 for the states of 
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, where the private 
investors are allowed to generate and distribute the electricity 
(Stamminger, 2009). Similarly, China adopted the wholesale model as it 
becomes liberalized in 1985 when local government and companies 
were encouraged to invest in the power sector (OECD/IEA, 2006). 
Wholesale competition model was also adopted in Nigeria by 
segregating of the power sector into subsectors and allowing the private 
investors to handle each of these subsectors, from the generation, 
transmission, to distribution/sale. The Privatization began in December 
2010 and by 2013 the Federal Government handed over to private 
investors i.e. the 11distribution companies (Discos) and 5 generation 
companies (Gencos). 
 
On the other hand, Malaysia adopted the vertically integrated model the 
TNB being the single buyer, having control from the generation, 
transmission, distribution/ sale to the end users. Franchises were given 
for the electricity suppliers as Independent Power producers (IPPs), it’s 
a kind of partial privatization approach (TNB, 2013). Similarly, power 
reform in Cameroon were not segregated that is, both the generation, 
transmission, distribution and sale of the sector were taken as an entity. 
AES (AES stands for American Electricity Service) becomes the only 
company in charge of generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of 
electricity in Cameroon (IFC Report, 2012). It’s a kind of natural 
monopoly and vertically integrated model.  South Africa (SA) follows 
the normal vertical integrated model as Eskom, being the sole provider 
of electricity from generation, transmission, distribution and sales in the 
country and has taken this as their exclusive right to supply electricity to 
the people (Hertzmark, 2012). The government embarks on power 
reform due to, inefficiency in the distribution sub-sector, restructuring 
and enhancing maximum integration to the interest of shareholder, low 
price without corresponding investment, for the empowerment of the 
black economy and to care for low income and poor household (Pan-
African Investment and Research Services, 2011; Jordaan, 2010). 
 
2.1 Government’s perspective of Electricity Privatization 
 
The political disposition of the government of each country to electricity 
privatization is the same in India, China, Nigeria and Cameroon but 
somewhat differ Malaysia and South Africa who have similar 
perspective. In the case of India, the government’s process for 
privatization was faulted by Srijan (2009), when he argued that the 
government is giving out on a franchise the prosperous revenue 
generating urban areas where there is high density of consumer and the 
electricity theft is insignificant, instead of the rural areas where there are 
low consumers, high electricity theft and line losses coupled with 
deteriorating power utility. This borders on partiality, the lack of 
transparency and sincerity on part of the government to actually put 
social welfare in the course of power reforms (Etieyibo, 2011; Srijan, 
2009), In the case of Delhi it was corruption and government complicity 
with the distribution company Distcoms (Purkayastha, 2014). 
 
In a similar dimension, the government imposition of excessive and 
irregular taxes on the private investors serves as the reason for excessive 
charges by the private investors in return (Garnaut et al. 2001), and 
some authors have recognized the absence of the rule of law as the major 
reason for economic failures in Russia (e.g., Shleifer 1997 in Yao, 
2004). However, a good numbers of paradigm shifts are surfacing in 
China’s power reforms (Aizhu, 2015;Jingsheng, 2015;Dupuy &Weston, 
2015;RAP, 2013).  
 
In Nigeria privatization of electricity was ill-conceived, as the 
fundamental issues and challenges bedeviling power supply were not 
addressed before jumpstarting into reforms, and that account for its 
colossal failure. While  in the interest of the government to provide 
adequate supply of electricity through reforms, access to quality 
electricity by the poor majority would not be guaranteed because of the 
high tariffs (Amadi, 2012; Oyadiran & Akintola, 2013) and poor 
distributive facilities (Etieyibo, 2011; Batini, 2012).  
 
In Cameroon the need for power reform was premised on 
misappropriation and insufficient fund to run the power sector. Prior to 
this, Sonel was already supplying electricity effectively and making profit 
(Kamdem, 2008; Pineau, 2004). Policy options are discussed to increase 
public investment spending and efficiency, while preserving fiscal 
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sustainability (IMF, 2014). Objectives of the Cameroonian 
government’s privatization are highlighted as to: - source revenue from 
the private sector and gain from their expertise, enhance quality of 
service, step up effectiveness in the generation, transmission, 
distribution and sales of electricity for easy accessibility to its 
productivity in the nearest future, induce competitiveness in its supply, 
harness the nations water resources potentials and embark on public 
private partnership of the SONEL’s business, (Pineau 2004). The 
International Financial Corporation (World Bank Group) was appointed 
by the government of Cameroon as lead advisor in the privatization 
process.  
 
In contrast, Malaysian motivation to privatization of electricity 
historically dated back to 1991 with the introduction of Privatization 
Master Plan. It was a kind of pre-planned framework studded with 
policy framework for privatization, implementation procedures and 
setting of priorities between projects to be privatized. The types and 
modes of privatization adopted are; Government-identified and private 
initiated approaches (Zamin, et al. 2013). Electricity privatization in 
Malaysia has been backed up by strong political-will, clear operating 
procedure, transparent, non-discriminatory, accountability and 
auditable functions which is being supported by the government has 
being the secret behind the  efficiency and effectiveness of the single 
buyer model. (Kasim, 2014; Zamin, et al. 2013). 
 
Similarly, the government of South Africa embarks on power reform 
due to, inefficiency in the distribution sub-sector, restructuring and 
enhancing maximum integration to the interest of shareholder, low 
price without corresponding investment, for the empowerment of the 
black economy and to care for low income and poor household. (Pan-
African Investment and Research Services, 2011; Jordaan, 2010).  
 
2.2 Expectations of the franchisees and Regulatory Framework 
 
The expectations from the private investors in the power reforms and 
operation of the regulatory institutions were other issues that 
differentiate the outcomes of electricity privatization in the selected 
countries. While the first four nations of India, China, Nigeria, and 
Cameroon shared the same experiences, Malaysia and South Africa 
related a different experience in this respect.  
 
To start with the reason for licensed franchisees of the power sector 
was to introduce competition into the electricity and enhance effective 
service delivery. However, this process is not possible with electricity 
supply as the customers have no freedom of choice (Srijan, 2009). It 
was also noted that the franchised saddled with the village electricity 
service delivery were not bothered about the electricity theft, but 
would instead asked for their share of the action. The shortage of staff 
of the distribution company also account for no proper monitoring so 
power theft became rampant in those villages. The distribution 
companies are not straightforward in their contractual dealings, instead 
they are funneling money to their sister companies through their 
exorbitant charges, since they are not accountable because of the 
monopoly (Purkayastha, 2014). Due consideration of the return on 
equity which is to be decided by the CERC concerning the tariff did not 
materialized due to the poor performance of the power sector (Srijan, 
2009). The regulatory body was tagged spineless as the electricity 
regulators having not been able to reform the ailing distribution 
networks. The regulatory bodies are not independent and actions are 
taken as dictated by the State governments. Tariffs are not regularized, 
it is advised that the politicians, regulators and citizens should take into 
cognizance the imperative of viable tariffs (Srijan, 2011). 
In the case of China, given the investment model and the source of 
funding, it stands as a challenge to any expectation from the private 
investors. Funding of China power sector is mostly state responsibility 
rendering operation inefficient and eventually unsustainable. The 
practice of modern management and technology are slowed down and 
the reduction in the level of competition in emerging power market is 
due to lack of foreign investment (OECD/IEA, 2006). The regulatory 
body is weakened by political interference. There is no independent 
regulatory body as the State Power Corporation favors its own 
generators. (OECD/IEA, 2006). 
 
In this respect, Nigeria is equally in a poor state, the new investors in 
the power sector, particularly the distribution companies, has yet to 
live up to their high reputation and competence as power supply in 
many homes in the country has continued to deteriorate without any 
sign of immediate improvement. The new investors are therefore 
expected to hit the ground first by concentrating on the total 
overhauling of the entire structure in the power sector so as to quickly 
restore the confidence of their esteemed customers who indeed are 
their partners in progress (Akabogu, 2014). The new National 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) has also been established. 
The establishment of this independent regulatory body is fundamental 
to the reform program and the objective of attracting private sector 
investment. But it has not lived to expectation. The need for an 
independent regulatory body in order to build investor confidence is 
recognized in the manner by which the members of the Commission 
are appointed and dismissed as well as the manner in which the 
Commission is to be funded under the provisions of the Bill.  
 
Finally in Cameroon, the franchise of electricity sector do not follow 
the established structure of the sector with four sub-sectors 
(generation, transmission, distribution and retail sales), as stated in the 
country’s electricity law of 1998. Each of these are supposed to be 
handled by different companies but was given to a single private 
investor. Accountability and transparency were not ensured giving 
their incoherent legal frameworks (Pineau, 2004). However, in the 
case of AES-Sonel its workforce of 4,000 were not affected except for 
the voluntary 360 workers that agreed on pre-retirement packages 
(Afrikeco 2002 in Pineau, 2004). The Electricity Sector Regulatory 
Agency (ARSEL), due to some inhibiting factors such as the 
privatization structure, electricity law, different decrees and counter 
decrees, was not effective as the regulatory body. The weak political 
independence and customer representation in the regulatory body, 
among others hampered their effective monitoring (IRIN News, 2015; 
Pineau, 2004).  
 
Whilst in Malaysia, there is one major single buyer and activities that 
still being controlled by the state. MyPower Corporation a regulatory 
body was established in 2010 to ensure the delivery of the reform 
recommendations. In order to ensure transparency and supervisory 
tendencies, compliance with these rules- Non-discriminatory, Ring-
fencing of Accounts, Cost Allocation, Limits on Sharing of Information, 
Ring-fencing of Operation; were rolled out by the regulatory body 
(Zamin, ET. Al. 2013).  
 
Similarly in South Africa, both Eskom and the municipal authorities are 
the principal supplier of electricity among the consumers. While 
Eskom is supplying directly to the industrial heavy users (Eskom, 
2012), the Municipals made almost 60% of their revenue from the 
distribution (Barnard, 2010). The municipal authorities, however, have 
been alleged with price manipulations as observed by Marais, (2013), 
but a kind of ring fenced interventions through the creation of Regional 
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Electrical Distributors REDs had been provided to checkmate this 
inflicting burden on the poor household (Herber, 2012; National 
Planning Commission, 2011;Steyn, 2003). There was creation of 
National Electrification Regulator (NER) for the protection of 
consumer’s interest and promotion of Electricity Supply Industry 
(ESI) efficiency. Among its positive influences are “serving the poor” 
an accelerated national electrification program, a new electricity 
regulator, restructuring the electricity distributors, Eskom 
corporatization, a paradigm shift in energy and electricity policy 
(Eberhard, 2007). 
 
2.3 Performance of power reform in Selected Countries 
 
The overall assessment of power reforms in these countries was 
inconclusive. While in some countries the performance is a success, 
in others it has been a  failure. For India the performance of the 
reform has been negative, given the subtle increase of tariffs, and 
poor financial health condition (Power Engineers, 2014). The 
ineffective service delivery has often led to the angry citizens taking 
to the streets in protest against terrible power situation. Some are 
keeping their businesses on with generator sets and inverter 
(Jayasekera, 2014; Purkayastha, 2014; Srijan, 2011).  
 
Similarly, in China the outcome of electricity privatization were not 
uniform between the regions some are successful while others failed. 
The regional differences in economic development contribute to the 
effectiveness of the adoption of the same privatization approach. 
Such differences include difficulty in the implementation of a unified 
pricing system, economic gaps and provincial issues, imbalance 
economic growth and different demand of consumption of electricity 
impacted on the success of privatization. 
 
In the same vein, the performance in Nigeria is also below expectation. 
The situation is no difference from before privatization. 
(IseOlorunkanmi, 2014; Okafor, 2014; Akinsulire, 2014; Onwe, 2014; 
Okekale; 2015) The power sector is described as one of the terrible 
sector in the world, as generation is far below demand, it has 
consequently been the inhibiting factor of economic development and 
national growth (Felix Ayanruoh, 2015)  
 
Similar situation is observed in Cameroon, the performance of power 
reform have been inadequate as demand outgrow supply. Unstable 
tariffs, lack of social face value, transparency, and weak non-
independent regulatory body, have also contributed to the situation.  
The foregoing are hinges on corruption in various shade which serve as 
major cause of power reform failure as it is commonly accepted that 
corruption is a bane of any development drive (Atangana, 2012)..    
 
However in Malaysia, the performance of power reform is in different 
dimension. The reformed Single Buyer is reinforced with clear, 
transparent, and auditable functions and operating procedures which 
allows for a non-discriminatory level playing field for participants. It is 
also well complemented by the implementation of competitive bidding 
while the performance incentive scheme under IBR will ensure efficient 
operation of SB. In a vertically-integrated environment, these 
mechanisms encourage efficiency and competition in the generation 
sector as well as promote confidence in MESI via improved 
transparency” (Zamin et, al; 2 013). 
 
India China Malaysia Nigeria Cameroon South Africa 
 Shortage of equipment 
in the power sector, 
KPMG report, (2010). 
 Existing equipment in 
deplorable, ailing 
(Bräuninger, 2013; 
Batini, 2012; Srijan, 
2009). 
 Regulatory bodies are 
not independent. 
 Pricing and tariffs need 
regularized to meet up 
with production cost 
especially in Delhi 
(Purkayastha, 2014; 
Srijan 20011). 
 Non transparency, 
corruption and absence 
of policy framework 
hampered power reform 
in India (Purkayastha, 
2014; Jayasekera, 
2014). 
 The issues of responsibil-
ity gap among the stake-
holders in system securi-
ty. 
 Complexity in evaluation 
of grids' huge assets 
 Depreciation of greater 
part of the grids’ trans-
mission and distribution 
facility 
 Wasteful investment in 
the country's grids due to 
lack of sufficient research 
and evaluation 
 Non-accountability and 
effective supervision 
 Lack of financial inde-
pendent and reform not 
fully market oriented. 
(Jingsheng, 2015). 
 The issues on Malaysia 
was a precaution. 
 The Electricity Commis-
sion must be transparent 
as to the real causes of the 
outages 
 There must be no politi-
cal interference in policy 
(Ahmad, 2014 Kaur, 
2014) 
 Malaysian Electricity 
Supply Industry (MESI) 
has challenges of tightness 
in fuel supply, industry 
control and unsustainable 
tariff structure (Zamin, 
2013) 
 Poor investment on power 
sector system facilities for 
the past decades 
 Non-maintenance of exist-
ing ones leading to deterio-
ration especially in the 
distribution sub-sector. 
 Privatization process was ill
- conceived and was hur-
riedly done 
 Due diligence was not 
followed, other areas are 
 The challenge of initial take
-off 
 Funding 
  Inadequate gas supply 
 Consumers 
 Fraudulent practices and 
unstable users tariffs 
 Reconciliation of assets and 
liabilities of PHCN 
 Workforce,   etc. and the 
outcome of it has been 
widely criticized among the 
intellectuals, public offi-
cials, and other stakehold-
ers (Oyelami, & Adewumi 
2014; Olusuyi ET, Al 
2014; Akhalumeh & Ohio-
kha, 2013; Franklin & 
Gabriel, 2014 
 Poor investment in power 
sector, (IMF, 2014) 
 Inadequate power supply, 
shortage of fund. 
 Hydro-generation water 
seasonal fluctuation (IFC 
Report, 2012; IRIN News, 
2015). 
 Political interference, 
 Weak regulatory body 
 Corruption (Atangana, 
2012) 
 Distributive defect, and 
pricing, are contentious 
issues in the country lead-
ing to public protest at 
times (IRIN News, 2015; 
Pineau, 2004). 
 Non-transparency and due 
process of the privatization 
transactions, the stakehold-
ers and intended private 
investors were in doubt as 
only one bidder eventually 
came up (World Bank/IFC 
Report, 2012; Pineau, 
2004; Pineau 2002a) 
 Inadequate utilization of 
available resources (AfDB, 
2015). 
 Provision of electricity 
at low price to both the 
industrial and house-
hold consumers. These 
led to the expansion of 
some of these heavy 
consumers of power 
 The extension of elec-
tricity to the cut off 
people by the apartheid 
and lack of correspond-
ing investment in the 
sector as demand in-
creases culminate into 
the experience of pow-
er shortage experienced 
in SA (Hertzmark, 
2012). 
 The challenge of no 
strong person behind 
the reform, instability 
of government has slow 
the process of power 
reform in spite of 
influences. 
Table 2 Issues and Challenges of Privatization in Selected Asia Countries 
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Similar to the above the performance of the power sector in South 
Africa serves as source of economic benefits to the government. 
However, the need for more competitive environment and pricing 
system moderation to allow more involvement of private investors in 
the generation and distribution should be created. Regional distributive 
networks are needful to protect the interest of the poor household and 
also cater for the labor intensive industries.  
 
 
3. Issues and Challenges of Privatization 
 
The issues and challenges garnered from the forgoing discussions were 
premised on factors related to different types of political institutions and 
government perspectives prevailing in each country, the kind of 
regulatory framework established, the state of condition infrastructure 
facilities and the level of investment in the power sectors over the years. 





The discourse of privatization of electricity in each country was based on 
selected power-related issues such as; Distribution reforms, 
Government’s perspective, Expectations of the franchisees, Regulatory 
framework, Business model and Technical aspect as outlined by 
Chaudhary (2013). The measuring factors of success and failure of 
privatization were tabulated to highlight the similarities and differences 
of privatization practice between the countries. The tables 3, 4 and 5 





The paper has highlighted the issue privatization policy to electricity 
supply and the issues and challenges related to the practices of the 
approach from the operations of the selected countries. It is believed 
that privatization policy itself  is neither good nor bad but depending 
on condition of the environment where it is been adopted, the political 
disposition, the government tenacity of purpose to rightly achieve its 
aims and objectives, and the implementation procedure are primary to 
the success or failure of the policy as seen explained in the paper. 
While power reform is a success in some developed countries, it is a 
failure in most of the developing countries. In the case of Malaysia the 
government is being precautious before adopting a full blown 
wholesale power reform. The power reform driving force and model 
of South Africa and Malaysia from the findings are identical and their 
performance similar as in table 4, 5, and 6. The motivation to privatize 
was base meeting up with their expansiveness in demand and 
economic growth and they actually made a concerted effort at 
mitigating their challenges. The reason for these disparities are not far-
Power related 
Issues 



































Ineffective Ineffective Effective Ineffective Effective Ineffective 
Regulatory frame-
work 
Influenced Influenced Independent Influenced Independent Influenced 








Technical aspect Deficient Deficient Efficient Deficient Efficient Deficient 
Table 3 Power Related Issues in Selected Countries 
Five Key Principles Meas-
uring Success 








Source of money Weak Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak 
Commercial performance Low Relative Good Low Good Low 
Customer service & financial 
health 
Weak Relative Good Weak Good Weak 
Incremental change Weak High High Weak Gradual Weak 
Management &  accountability Low Relative High Low High Low 
Table 4 Five Key Principles Measuring Success or Failure of Power Reform 
Source: Authors’ assessment based on available data 
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fetched, just as the industrialized countries they were well prepared and 
articulately planned for it. Others like Nigeria, Cameroon, India and 
China, were either pressurized for their economic depression and 
chronic budget deficit, presumptuously not tidying up their domestic 
problematic fundamental issues, venture into reform and become 
ineffective. Political interference, non-transparency, corruption, among 
others are amongst causes for the poor performance of power reforms in 
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